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use#LAA$100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALK: SUBOPTIMAL INVESTMENT
IN 401(K) PLANS
James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian*
Abstract—We identify employees at seven companies whose 401(k)
investment choices are dominated because they are contributing less than
the employer matching contribution threshold despite being vested in
their match and being able to make penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for
any reason because they are older than 59½. At the average ﬁrm, 36% of
match-eligible employees over age 59½ forgo arbitrage proﬁts that aver-
age 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. A survey educating employees
about the free lunch they are forgoing raised contribution rates by a
statistically insigniﬁcant 0.67% of income among those completing the
survey.
I. Introduction
D
O households make savings and investment mistakes?
It is typically difﬁcult to prove that they do, despite
widespread concern about household ﬁnancial literacy
(Campbell, 2006; Bernheim, 1994, 1995, 1998; Lusardi &
Mitchell, 2007). The household investment problem is sufﬁ-
ciently complex and economic theory sufﬁciently rich that
few restrictions can be imposed on the range of optimal
investment behaviors we should observe. Hence, there is
substantial disagreement on important questions about
household ﬁnancial competence, such as whether Ameri-
cans are undersaving for retirement
1 and whether the
common practice of holding undiversiﬁed portfolios is a
mistake.
2
But sometimes, incentives are strong enough to create
sharp normative restrictions. In this paper, we identify a
large class of employees who commonly make choices that
are dominated by other options in their choice set. These
employees have the following attributes: they are over 59½
years old; they have their 401(k) contributions up to a
threshold matched by their employer; those matching con-
tributions are at least partially vested (i.e., the employees
can keep at least some of the matching funds even if they
immediately separate from the ﬁrm); and because they are
older than 59½, they can make withdrawals from their
401(k) for any reason without penalty, even while still
employed by the ﬁrm.
For workers who satisfy these criteria, contributing to the
401(k) at a rate below the match threshold is dominated by
a deviation that raises the contribution rate up to the match
threshold. The contribution increase triggers instant wind-
fall gains because of the employer match. If the employee
then needs access to the additional money contributed, she
can withdraw those funds from the plan without penalty
and still keep the match.
We calculate a lower bound for money-metric welfare
losses from imperfect optimization by computing the differ-
ence between the payoff to contributing less than the match
threshold and the payoff to the following undominated
contribute-and-withdraw strategy: increase the before-tax
401(k) contribution rate so that total contributions are at the
match threshold, and withdraw the additional contribution
amounts shortly after they are made from either the before-
tax or match account. Relative to the original strategy, the
arbitrage raises the employee’s wealth inside the 401(k) plan
while leaving her resources outside the plan unaffected.
3
We ﬁnd that at the average ﬁrm (equally weighting each
ﬁrm) in our sample of seven ﬁrms, 36% of the match-eligi-
ble employees over 59½ years old could gain arbitrage
proﬁts using the contribute-and-withdraw strategy because
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1 Skinner (2007) surveys the debate on U.S. savings adequacy. Studies
that conclude there is a signiﬁcant undersaving problem include Bernheim
(1997), Mitchell and Moore (1998), Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000),
and Munnell, Webb, and Delorme (2006). Studies that argue undersaving
is uncommon include Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), Engen, Gale,
and Uccello (1999), and Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006). Our
results are not necessarily inconsistent with this latter group of papers; it
may be the case that the majority of households are acting optimally, but
a substantial minority is making serious mistakes.
2 The recommendation to hold a diversiﬁed portfolio is foundational to
modern portfolio theory. However, theoretical and empirical defenses of
concentrated portfolio holding include DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer
(2004), Ivkovic ´ and Weisbenner (2005), Massa and Simonov (2006), Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006, 2010), and Ivkovic ´, Sialm, and
Weisbenner (2008).
3 In the short run, the employee’s gain from increased matches is the
employer’s loss. Nevertheless, employers have been rapidly adopting
measures such as automatic enrollment in order to boost their 401(k) par-
ticipation rates, despite the increased matching expenditures required.
This is in part driven by a desire to satisfy IRS nondiscrimination rules. In
the long run, it is not clear that higher matching expenditures will raise
compensation costs. If the ﬁrm can reduce wage growth to offset match-
ing expenditures, then the tax advantages of compensating workers
through the pension plan could actually reduce compensation costs.
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 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technologythey are contributing less than the match threshold. Under
the null hypothesis of rationality and unsatiated utility, none
of these employees would be under the match threshold. An
employee’s arbitrage losses are bounded above by the total
matching contributions available to her. Among employees
with a strictly positive loss, the average loss within a ﬁrm
ranges from 24% to 98% of the employee’s maximum pos-
sible arbitrage loss. As a percentage of salary, this translates
into an average annual loss that ranges from 0.7% ($162) at
the company with the least generous match to 2.3% ($782)
at the company with the most generous match; the average
across companies (equally weighting each company) is
1.6% of annual pay, or $507. There are much larger losses
in the right tail. For example, in the company with the most
generous match, the largest loss was $7,596 in 1998,
or 6.0% of the worker’s salary. We ﬁnd that substantial
losses remain even after accounting for reasonable costs for
the time required to execute the contribute-and-withdraw
strategy.
Although the contribute-and-withdraw strategy domi-
nates the original policy of contributing less than the match
threshold, it may not be the optimal savings strategy. That
is why the utility difference between the contribute-and-
withdraw strategy and the original strategy is a lower bound
on the total utility losses from imperfect optimization. If an
employee’s portfolio fails to clear the minimal hurdle of no
arbitrage, the employee may be making other more subtle
optimization errors in her consumption and investment
choices.
The fact that so many employees in our sample fail to
take full advantage of the employer match is especially sur-
prising because one would expect this population to be
aware of the beneﬁts of a 401(k) savings plan. Since the
people we study are at least 59½ years old, the need for
retirement savings should be salient to them. Having dec-
ades of experience managing their money, they should be
more ﬁnancially savvy than their younger counterparts.
And at the average company, their mean tenure is sixteen
years, so they have had ample time to familiarize them-
selves with their 401(k) plans.
To better understand why older employees do not take
full advantage of their 401(k) match, we conducted a ﬁeld
experiment at one of our sample companies with the help of
Hewitt Associates, the ﬁrm that supplied our 401(k) data.
The experiment consisted of randomly assigning employees
to receive one of two surveys about their 401(k). The treat-
ment survey contained questions highlighting the forgone
match money and the fact that there is no loss of liquidity
from contributing up to the match threshold. The control
survey did not include these explanatory questions but was
otherwise identical.
The information treatment produced only a small intent-
to-treat response, raising the average 401(k) contribution
rate by a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.10 percentage points of
income. Using assignment to the treatment group as an
instrumental variable for actually getting treated, we esti-
mate a larger but still statistically insigniﬁcant average
treatment effect on contribution rates of 0.67 percentage
points. We ﬁnd evidence that employees who are not fully
exploiting the employer match are more prone to delay tak-
ing other proﬁtable actions than employees at or above the
threshold, suggesting that time-inconsistent preferences
play some role in undermining optimal investment choices.
Survey responses also indicate that direct transactions costs
do not explain the failure to contribute to the match thresh-
old. Rather, these individuals appear to have high indirect
decision-making costs, as they are much less ﬁnancially
sophisticated and knowledgeable about their ﬁrm’s 401(k)
plan.
Several previous papers have argued that households fail
to exploit apparent arbitrage opportunities. Gross and Sou-
leles (2002) document that some households simultaneously
hold high-interest credit card debt and low-interest check-
ing balances, but some have argued that such holdings are
not no-arbitrage violations because demand deposits and
credit cards are not perfect substitutes, differing in transac-
tion utility and treatment under bankruptcy (Lehnert &
Maki, 2007; Zinman, 2007; Bertaut, Haliassos, & Reiter,
2009). Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) and Barber and
Odean (2004) identify unexploited tax arbitrage, showing
that many households hold heavily taxed assets in taxable
accounts and lightly taxed assets in tax-deferred accounts.
4
Here also, theoretical research has been divided on whether
such allocations are in fact suboptimal (Amromin, 2003;
Dammon, Spatt, & Zhang, 2004; Garlappi & Huang, 2006).
Amromin, Huang, and Sialm (2007) argue that some U.S.
households that pay their mortgages down more quickly
than a 30-year amortization schedule requires would be bet-
ter off saving the prepayment amounts in a tax-deferred
account instead, although they note that this strategy is not
risk-free because it is vulnerable to factors such as interest
rate changes and moving-related mortgage prepayment risks.
Warshawsky (1987) highlights unexploited arbitrage oppor-
tunities available to individuals with whole life insurance
policies who, due to increases in market interest rates subse-
quenttotheirpolicypurchase,couldborrowagainsttheirpol-
icy’s cash value at rates below what they could earn by
investing in similarly risky outside assets. But in this case,
the extent of such unexploited arbitrage depends on assump-
tions about the rate of return on other assets, individuals’
access to outside investments of similar risk, individuals’
marginal tax rates, and the amount of measurement error in
the survey data used. Relative to this previous work, our
401(k)arbitrageopportunityhas the advantage of being theo-
retically unambiguous and requiring few additional assump-
tionstoidentify.
4 Venti and Wise (1992) make a related point, noting that many indivi-
duals older than 59½ do not have IRAs, even though IRA balances are
tax-advantaged and can be withdrawn without penalty by these house-
holds. They do not, however, calculate the extent of any losses associated
with IRA nonparticipation.
749 $100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALKOur paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our
data and the characteristics of the 401(k) plans and employ-
ees in our sample. Section III discusses the methodology
we use to calculate arbitrage losses in the 401(k) plan. Sec-
tion IV presents the arbitrage loss calculation results. Sec-
tion V examines the frequency with which employees forgo
matching money, whether or not doing so constitutes a no-
arbitrage violation. Section VI presents the employee and
plan correlates of arbitrage losses and forgone match
money. Section VII presents the ﬁeld experiment and dis-
cusses potential reasons that individuals are reluctant to
contribute up to the match threshold. Section VIII con-
cludes.
II. Data Description
A. Data Structure
Our data come from Hewitt Associates, a large beneﬁts
administration and consulting ﬁrm. The sample consists of
a year-end 1998 cross-section of all employees at seven
ﬁrms that span many different industries: consumer pro-
ducts, electronics, health care, manufacturing, technology,
transportation, and utilities. We refer to these ﬁrms as Com-
pany A through Company G. The cross-section contains
employee information such as birthdate, hire date, gender,
and compensation. It also contains point-in-time informa-
tion on each employee’s 401(k) on the date of the snapshot,
including participation status in the plan, date of ﬁrst parti-
cipation, elected contribution rate, and total balances. In
addition, the cross-section has annual measures of indivi-
dual and employer contribution ﬂows into the 401(k) plan.
At Company F, we were able to conduct a ﬁeld experi-
ment described in section VII. At this company we have
additional cross-sectional snapshots for August 1, 2004, and
November 1, 2004. We also have data from surveys mailed
during August 2004 to 889 Company F employees over the
age of 59½, which we can link to the administrative data.
5
B. Sample 401(k) Plan Rules
We selected our seven sample ﬁrms because they offer
an employer match and allow employees over the age of
59½ to make withdrawals from their 401(k) balances for
any reason (even in the absence of documented ﬁnancial
hardship) without penalty, whether or not they are still
employed at the company. Companies are not required to
allow withdrawals for workers they still employ, so these
ﬁrms have made an active decision to permit such in-ser-
vice withdrawals. There are two potential penalties asso-
ciated with making a withdrawal, neither of which affects
the contribute-and-withdraw strategy’s payoffs for the sam-
ple employees over 59½. First, there is a 10% federal tax
penalty levied on individuals under the age of 59½. Second,
some companies prohibit employee contributions for a per-
iod of time after a withdrawal, which precludes receipt of
matching contributions during that time. Our sample ﬁrms
do not limit future contributions after withdrawals of
before-tax and match balances.
Table 1 summarizes the other 401(k) plan rules that are
relevant for understanding the payoffs to the contribute-
and-withdraw strategy at the seven ﬁrms. These can be
divided into rules that govern who is allowed to contribute
to the plan and in what form, rules that govern the match,
and rules that govern withdrawals from the plan.
Most employees at these ﬁrms are eligible to participate
in the 401(k) plan either immediately after hire or after a
short waiting period. At Company A, union employees are
excluded from the plan. Eligible employees at all ﬁrms can
make contributions using before-tax money, and some ﬁrms
also allow contributions using after-tax money.
The maximum gain from the match in our sample is 6%
of annual salary for certain employees at Company F who
are matched at a 100% rate for the ﬁrst 6% of their pay con-
tributed to the 401(k) plan. Company B offers the smallest
potential gain of 0.75% of annual salary as it matches only
25 cents per dollar for the ﬁrst 3% of pay contributed. Four
of the ﬁrms in our sample (Companies D, E, F, and G)
invest the match in employer stock and restrict diversiﬁca-
tion of match balances. These restrictions are lifted for
Company D employees age 50 and over. In the remaining
three companies, restrictions apply even for those over age
59½, but diversiﬁcation is not entirely prohibited. Company
E allows salaried employees to diversify half of the match
after age 55 or ﬁve years of service at the company. Com-
pany F employees who have participated in the plan for ﬁve
years can completely diversify money that has been in the
plan for at least two years. And Company G allows com-
plete diversiﬁcation of money that has been in the plan for
at least two years.
Employees do not have access to their employer match
money until it is vested. If an employee is only 80% vested
when he leaves the company, he forfeits 20% of the bal-
ances accrued in his match account. If the employer allows
withdrawals from the match account while the employee is
still working at that ﬁrm, the employee can withdraw only
the vested amount. In our sample of ﬁrms, the fraction of
match money vested is a function of an employee’s tenure
at the company (and not time since a speciﬁc contribution
was made to the 401(k) plan).
6 For example, once an
employee crosses the tenure requirement for 60% vesting,
all of her existing match balances are immediately 60%
vested, and new matching contributions going forward will
also be 60% vested.
5 We also mailed surveys to 4,000 employees below the age of 59½.
Results from those respondents are available on request.
6 This stands in contrast to vesting practices for employee stock options,
where each option grant comes with its own vesting schedule tied to when
the grant was made, so that an employee may simultaneously have dif-
ferent option grants that are fully vested, partially vested, and not vested
at all.
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751 $100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALKMatching contributions at Company G are fully vested
from the ﬁrst day of an employee’s tenure. Companies B,
C, and E use a graded vesting schedule in which the frac-
tion of match balances vested increases gradually with
years of service until the employee is 100% vested. For
instance, employees at Company B are 0% vested until the
end of their second year at the company. At the beginning
of their third year at the company, they are 20% vested, and
their vesting percentage increases by 20% at the beginning
of each subsequent year until they are 100% vested at the
beginning of their seventh year. In contrast, Companies A,
D, and F have cliff vesting schedules in which employees
are not vested at all before achieving ﬁve years of tenure
and are 100% vested thereafter. Four of the companies
with graded or cliff vesting schedules fully vest employees
who reach a certain age even if they would not be
fully vested based on their tenure alone (Companies A, B,
C, and D).
With the exception of Company A, the sample ﬁrms
impose some restrictions on withdrawals from the 401(k)
while a worker is still employed at the ﬁrm. Only some of
these restrictions affect the contribute-and-withdraw strat-
egy. At Company E, accounts must be depleted in the fol-
lowing order: after-tax balances, before-tax balances, and
ﬁnally match balances. That is, accounts earlier in the order
must be completely empty before accounts later in the order
can be accessed. At Company F, the mandated order is
after-tax, match, and ﬁnally before-tax balances. At Com-
pany G, the mandated order is after-tax balances, match
balances that have been in the plan for more than two years,
rollover balances, and ﬁnally before-tax balances; match
balances that have been in the plan for less than two years
may not be withdrawn. Companies E, F, and G also impose
withdrawal frequency restrictions that cap withdrawals at
either six or twelve per year. Companies E and F respec-
tively impose a $100 and $250 minimum withdrawal
amount. We discuss the impact of the withdrawal order
rules in section III and the impact of the withdrawal fre-
quency and amount restrictions in section IV B.
All seven ﬁrms allow participants to request withdrawals
by calling a toll-free number. Four of our ﬁrms specify in
their plan documents how quickly withdrawal checks are
issued. Three issue them within one week of the request,
and the fourth mails checks in two to three weeks.
C. Sample Employee Characteristics
Table 2 reports summary employee characteristics as of
year-end 1998 for the 5,045 active employees in our sample
who were older than age 59½ at the beginning of 1998, eli-
gible to receive matching contributions in 1998, and whose
1998 salary exceeded that of a full-time worker earning the
federal minimum wage.
7 For comparison, we also present
employee attributes for the match-eligible population
younger than age 59½ earning more than the salary cutoff
at these ﬁrms. Our sample generally has a male worker
majority but includes one ﬁrm (Company B) that is predo-
minantly female. Firm-level median salary among older
workers ranges from $11,829 to $57,788, and median
401(k) balance among plan participants also exhibits con-
siderable dispersion, from $7,635 to $117,151. At most
ﬁrms, the average tenure among older workers is greater
than 12 years, but at Company A, this average is 5.9 years.
At the average ﬁrm, 86% of employees over 59½ have
enrolled in the 401(k), and 75% made a 401(k) contribution
in the last pay cycle of 1998. The analogous averages for
employees under 59½ are 82% and 74%, respectively. As a
TABLE 2.—EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS OF SEVEN FIRMS AT YEAR-END 1998
Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G
Total active employees Over 4,000 Over 50,000 Over 10,000 Over 20,000 Over 30,000 Over 20,000 Over 10,000
Match-eligible employees older than 59½
Number of employees 537 2,084 242 383 841 816 142
Fraction male (%) 82.7% 16.7% 58.9% 73.3% 65.2% 91.7% 70.4%
Average age (years) 68.2 64.4 63.6 62.7 63.0 62.6 62.6
Average tenure (years) 5.9 14.9 12.1 22.5 22.2 16.0 18.4
Median salary $11,829 $24,705 $43,711 $40,830 $45,812 $32,444 $57,788
Fraction who have ever enrolled in the 401(k) 72.6% 64.0% 97.1% 92.2% 84.5% 90.7% 98.6%
Fraction contributing to 401(k) at year-end 1998 33.3% 51.2% 90.1% 88.3% 79.5% 82.8% 97.2%
Median 401(k) balance of participants $7,635 $16,259 $69,440 $117,151 $90,983 $46,830 $47,382
Match-eligible employees younger than 59½
Fraction male 49.5% 19.1% 66.0% 70.6% 65.7% 81.7% 76.9%
Average age (years) 38.2 41.3 39.2 42.3 43.2 43.7 44.0
Average tenure (years) 5.5 8.3 7.7 14.1 15.3 10.9 17.7
Median salary $23,229 $29,267 $44,932 $38,605 $46,854 $32,326 $62,111
Fraction who have ever enrolled in the 401(k) 64.2% 57.9% 88.5% 92.8% 86.7% 86.2% 99.6%
Fraction contributing to 401(k) at year-end 1998 44.9% 46.6% 79.9% 85.0% 83.7% 81.1% 96.7%
Median 401(k) balance of participants $11,521 $9,136 $31,669 $45,215 $52,951 $30,258 $53,078
The sample for all rows but the ﬁrst is employees who are eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution in 1998 and whose 1998 salary is more than that of a full-time minimum-wage worker. The ﬁrst row
includes all employees at each company, whether or not they meet the eligibility and salary requirements. We sort employees into age subsamples based on their age on January 1, 1998. However, all statistics are
reported as of year-end 1998. To maintain the conﬁdentiality of the companies analyzed, we report only the approximate number of total active employees and not the number of employees under the age of 59½.
7 The annual salary cutoff we use is $5.15/hour   35 hours/week   50
weeks/year ¼ $9,012.50.
752 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSpoint of comparison, 63% of all eligible U.S. workers were
participating in a 401(k) or 403(b) plan in 1998 (Copeland,
2009).
III. Arbitrage Loss Calculation Methodology
For an employee contributing less than the match thresh-
old, the contribute-and-withdraw strategy consists of raising
his before-tax contribution rate so that total contributions
are at the match threshold and then withdrawing this extra
contribution amount shortly afterward from the before-tax
or match account. Withdrawals from before-tax and match
401(k) balances are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate on
the entire withdrawal. Thus, under our strategy, when the
incremental contribution is withdrawn, its entirety is taxed
as ordinary income. If the employee were to continue con-
tributing less than the match threshold, the incremental con-
tribution amount would have been immediately taxed as
ordinary income anyway. Therefore, the strategy does not
affect the employee’s current tax liability.
8
To calculate arbitrage losses, we start with the difference
between the maximum possible matching contributions that
individuals could have received in 1998 and the match they
actually received.
9 This difference represents the additional
401(k) balances they would have accrued (before capital
gains) by following the contribute-and-withdraw strategy.
We then make a few adjustments to this number to arrive at
our ﬁnal arbitrage loss ﬁgures.
Not being vested can eliminate the arbitrage gains from
contributing up to the match threshold. If an employee is
not vested and knows that she will leave the company
before becoming even partially vested, the employer match
is worth nothing to her.
10 On the other hand, the employer
match should be fully valued if the currently unvested
employee is completely conﬁdent that she will stay at the
company until she is fully vested. In practice, incomplete
vesting does not signiﬁcantly affect our calculation of arbit-
rage losses because almost all sample employees over 59½
years old are fully vested as of January 1, 1998. We handle
the small fraction of employees who are not fully vested in
the following way.
Because we do not know each unvested employee’s sub-
jective probability of leaving the company before becoming
vested, we adopt a conservative approach. The loss from
not contributing up to the employer match threshold is cal-
culated as the employer match forgone multiplied by the
employee’s vested percentage at the time of the contribu-
tion.
11 For example, consider an employee in a ﬁrm with a
dollar-for-dollar (100%) match up to 5% of pay whose vest-
ing percentage increases from 0% to 20% on July 1, 1998.
In calculating the arbitrage losses in calendar year 1998, we
do not include any forgone matching contributions prior to
July 1, 1998. After this date, when the employee’s vesting
percentage increases to 20%, her calculated losses are only
20% of the forgone employer match. So if this employee
contributed 2% of her salary every pay period, then her
arbitrage losses for the year as a fraction of her annual sal-
ary would be deﬁned as
1
2
0%   5%   2% ðÞ   100% ðÞ
þ
1
2
20%  ð 5%   2%Þ 100% ðÞ ¼ 0:3%:
Note that this calculation will understate expected losses by
ignoring all continuation values from receiving the match.
In unreported results, we ﬁnd that calculating ex post losses
using the employee’s actual subsequent employment history
at the company yields numbers that are only slightly
greater.
12 The results are similar because almost all sample
employees over 59½ years old are fully vested.
In some of our companies, employees can contribute to
the 401(k) using after-tax dollars. Withdrawals from after-
tax balances are taxed only on accumulated capital gains.
Therefore, if an employee has after-tax balances, the ability
to shift withdrawals from those balances into years when
her marginal tax rate is high is a potentially valuable
option.
13 At Companies E, F, and G, after-tax 401(k) bal-
ances must be depleted ﬁrst when withdrawing money from
the plan.
14 Executing the contribute-and-withdraw strategy
at these companies would require withdrawing after-tax
balances in the current year, eliminating the option to delay
those withdrawals.
8 Direct withdrawals from the 401(k) are subject to a mandatory 20%
withholding that is credited toward the employee’s overall tax liability.
This withholding can be bypassed, if desired, by rolling over the withdra-
wal into one’s IRA and then withdrawing from the IRA.
9 This calculation takes into account two relevant IRS limits on 401(k)
contributions that apply to individuals (rather than households). First, IRS
section 402(g)(3) sets a maximum dollar limit on an employee’s before-
tax contributions, which was $10,000 per year in 1998. Second, IRS sec-
tion 415(b)(1)(A) prohibits employee 401(k) contributions out of annual
compensation above a certain amount, which was $160,000 in 1998.
(Both thresholds have increased in subsequent years.) In a plan that
matches 100% of contributions up to 5% of salary, an employee who
earned $200,000 in 1998 could only receive a maximum of $8,000 that
year in matching contributions ($160,000   0.05). Because the match
threshold for employees in our sample does not exceed 6%, the $10,000
contribution limit does not in practice constrain any employees from
receiving the full employer match available under their plan rules once
the $160,000 compensation limit is accounted for.
10 These employees may still realize some tax beneﬁt if they participate
in the 401(k).
11 Because we only observe an employee’s total contributions for a
calendar year, we assume that the contribution rate was constant through-
out that year.
12 We use data from future years at these companies for these alterna-
tive calculations.
13 As an extreme example, suppose that the tax rate on 401(k) withdra-
wals next year jumped to 100%. Then before-tax 401(k) balances cannot
fund consumption in that year, whereas after-tax balances could still be
used.
14 Company E no longer allowed after-tax contributions at year-end
1998, so any after-tax balances present are legacies of a prior plan regime.
Companies C and E require rollover balances to be depleted before
before-tax balances can be accessed, but none of the employees classiﬁed
as having arbitrage losses at these companies have rollover balances.
753 $100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALKOnly 17% of employees older than 59½ who contribute
less than the match threshold at these three ﬁrms have after-
tax 401(k) balances. In order to avoid having to calculate
the loss caused by early withdrawals from the after-tax
account, we simply do not attribute arbitrage losses to any-
body at Companies E, F, and G who had a positive balance
in her after-tax account at year-end 1998, regardless of her
401(k) contribution rate. This conservative assumption
leads us to understate the fraction of employees who are
forgoing a free lunch.
Companies E, F, and G also invest their match balances
in employer stock and restrict diversiﬁcation for employees
older than 59½. This constraint is not binding at Companies
E and F because their employees are allowed to withdraw
match balances, and the match can be converted to cash
upon withdrawal.
15 The constraint does bind at Company
G, which does not allow diversiﬁcation or withdrawal of
match balances held in the plan for less than two years. A
match in employer stock is worth less than a match that can
be diversiﬁed.
16 However, it is not clear how large the bias
is, since employees can sell employer stock short in a non-
401(k) account, so a sophisticated employee could hedge
herself against its idiosyncratic risk. We do not make
further adjustments to the arbitrage losses calculated for
Company G’s employees, but note that their loss magni-
tudes may be somewhat overstated.
Finally, to allow the possibility of rounding error, we do
not classify an employee as failing to fully exploit the
employer match if her calculated arbitrage loss is less than
0.1% of annual income.
IV. Frequency and Magnitude of Arbitrage Losses
A. Baseline Results
Table 3 reports the frequency and magnitude of
unexploited 401(k) arbitrage in 1998. At the average com-
pany in our sample, 36% of match-eligible employees over
age 59½ did not receive the full employer match despite
being at least partially vested and not having after-tax bal-
ances that must be depleted before before-tax balances can
be withdrawn. The most an individual can lose due to
unexploited arbitrage is the total matching contribution
available to him that immediately vests. At Company B,
which offers the smallest match, the upper bound is 0.75%
of salary. At the other extreme, Company F offers a match
as large as 6% of salary for some of its employees. Among
those with arbitrage losses, the average loss as a fraction of
TABLE 3.—ARBITRAGE LOSSES IN 1998: EMPLOYEES OVER AGE 59½
Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G
Number with arbitrage losses 320 973 113 78 263 196 36
Fraction of sample who have arbitrage losses 59.6% 46.7% 46.7% 20.4% 31.3% 24.0% 25.4%
Maximum possible loss as a fraction of pay 2% 0.75% 4.5% 3% 1.2%–2.1% 1.5%–6% 4.5%
Among those with arbitrage losses:
Average fraction of maximum possible loss realized 97.5% 96.8% 34.2% 69.2% 81.4% 72.4% 23.7%
Fraction contributing nothing 95.0% 93.7% 21.2% 73.1% 69.6% 54.1% 11.1%
Among those contributing nothing, fraction who
have never enrolled in the 401(k)
34.2% 71.0% 25.0% 52.7% 71.0% 38.6% 50.5%
Average loss, percentage of annual pay 1.71% 0.66% 1.53% 2.07% 1.63% 2.32% 1.07%
Average loss, $ $215 $162 $642 $722 $677 $782 $350
Distribution of losses as a percentage of annual pay ($)
Maximum 2.00%
($947)
0.75%
($1,200)
4.50%
($6,357)
3.00%
($2,651)
2.10%
($3,360)
6.00%
($7,596)
4.50%
($1,182)
95th percentile 2.00%
($379)
0.75%
($367)
4.50%
($2,192)
3.00%
($1,560)
2.10%
($1,756)
4.45%
($1,521)
4.50%
($1,168)
90th percentile 2.00%
($320)
0.75%
($291)
4.50%
($1,650)
3.00%
($1,397)
2.10%
($1,412)
3.00%
($1,098)
4.50%
($1,004)
75th percentile 2.00%
($252)
0.75%
($195)
2.62%
($953)
3.00%
($1,048)
2.10%
($859)
3.00%
($938)
1.44%
($489)
Median 2.00%
($204)
0.75%
($134)
0.51%
($268)
3.00%
($662)
2.10%
($582)
2.51%
($747)
0.25%
($121)
25th percentile 1.57%
($181)
0.75%
($89)
0.17%
($65)
0.88%
($262)
1.05%
($257)
1.50%
($429)
0.17%
($80)
10th percentile 0.75%
($93)
0.31%
($66)
0.17%
($50)
0.41%
($126)
0.37%
($173)
0.91%
($262)
0.17%
($60)
5th percentile 0.42%
($42)
0.22%
($42)
0.17%
($47)
0.24%
($89)
0.33%
($106)
0.45%
($132)
0.17%
($48)
Minimum 0.11%
($11)
0.10%
($11)
0.11%
($33)
0.10%
($36)
0.15%
($41)
0.13%
($40)
0.17%
($47)
The sample is employees age 59½ and older on January 1, 1998, who are eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution and whose 1998 salary is more than that of a full-time minimum-wage worker. Arbitrage
losses arise from not contributing at least to the match threshold, being at least partially vested in the match, and not having after-tax balances that must be depleted before other balances can be withdrawn.
15 The process for circumventing the diversiﬁcation restriction is
slightly more complicated at Company G because the ﬁrm requires the
before-tax account to be depleted before the match can be withdrawn.
The solution is to roll over the entire 401(k) balance into an IRA and
diversify the employer stock once it is in the IRA.
16 Poterba (2003), Meulbroek (2005), and Brennan and Torous (1999)
calculate discounts for portfolios that are partially invested in employer
stock.
754 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSthe maximum potential loss ranges from 24% to 98%; the
cross-company average is 68%. Conditional on having a
loss, the average loss ranges from 0.66% of salary ($162) at
Company B to 2.32% of salary ($782) at Company F; the
cross-company average is 1.57% ($507).
17 The proportion
lost relative to the maximum possible loss is driven largely
by the fraction of employees who contributed nothing at all.
Companies C and G are notable for having a relatively
small number of nonparticipants; at the other ﬁve compa-
nies, at least half of those with arbitrage losses gave up the
entire match.
The bottom half of table 3 shows the distribution of arbit-
rage losses, in both absolute dollars and as a percentage of
pay, among those whom we classify as having an arbitrage
loss.
18 In companies with a generous match, the losses at
the right tail of the distribution are considerable. For exam-
ple, the 75th percentile arbitrage losses at Companies C, D,
and F are around $1,000 and 3% of salary. At the 90th per-
centile, arbitrage losses at Company E and G also exceeded
$1,000, or 2.1% and 4.5% of salary, respectively. The maxi-
mum dollar arbitrage loss ranges from $947 (2% of salary)
at Company A to $7,596 (6% of salary) at Company F.
The absolute dollar losses in table 3, which are calculated
over only one year, are likely to be much smaller than the
cumulative absolute dollar losses over time. Among those
who contributed nothing to their 401(k) plan in 1998, 49% at
the average company are not enrolled in the plan, which
means that they have never contributed to the plan, thus giv-
ing up matching contributions during their entire tenure with
the company. We do not attempt an exact calculation of
cumulative losses for all employees because doing so would
require information on 401(k) eligibility, the 401(k) match,
employee compensation, and employee contribution rates for
many years before 1998, which we do not have. But a simple
extrapolation from table 3 suggests that substantial cumula-
tivelossesareprobableformanyoftheseindividuals.
B. Accounting for the Time Costs of the Contribute-and-
Withdraw Strategy
We have so far ignored the cost of the time required to
execute the contribute-and-withdraw strategy. If this cost is
large, it could wipe out the potential arbitrage gains. In this
subsection, we estimate arbitrage proﬁts net of time costs.
In the survey described in section VII, respondents who
had already enrolled in their 401(k) reported spending 1.4
hours on average doing so. Respondents who had made
further transactions in their 401(k) reported spending 0.6
hours on average to change either their contribution rate or
asset allocation for the very ﬁrst time. If taking a withdra-
wal from the plan is as time-consuming as changing one’s
asset allocation or contribution rate for the ﬁrst time and
does not get faster as the employee gains experience, then a
nonparticipant would spend 8.6 hours on average in the ﬁrst
year of the contribute-and-withdraw strategy enrolling in
the plan and then withdrawing his contributions once a
month; a current plan participant would spend 7.8 hours on
average increasing his contribution rate to the match thresh-
old and then withdrawing monthly.
Taking these numbers as a baseline, we consider a range
of annual time requirements for executing the contribute-
and-withdraw strategy: 3, 6, and 12 hours per year. We also
consider two different assumptions about the value of this
time: the hourly wage, and half the hourly wage. Neoclassi-
cal labor supply theory suggests the value of the marginal
hour is the wage rate. The literature on travel costs ﬁnds on
average that time spent commuting is valued at about 50%
of the wage rate (Small, 1992). Since we do not have infor-
mation on weekly hours or hourly wages, we divide annual
salary by 1,750 yearly hours to approximate the hourly
wage.
Table 4 shows that at all companies, under the most con-
servative estimate of the contribute-and-withdraw strategy’s
time cost (three hours at half the hourly wage rate), the frac-
tion of our sample with net arbitrage losses is the same as
the fraction with arbitrage losses ignoring time costs,
although the average size of the net arbitrage losses condi-
tional on having a net loss is slightly smaller (between $10
and $37). As we increase either the time required or the
value of a marginal hour, the fraction of the sample with
net arbitrage losses falls. But even under our most aggres-
sive assumptions about the time cost (twelve hours at the
hourly wage rate), 26% of older employees at the average
ﬁrm continue to have net arbitrage losses averaging $476.
Time costs can be substantially reduced by withdrawing
less frequently—for example, once every three months
rather than every month. Little efﬁciency is lost by this
modiﬁcation because the implicit ﬁnancing costs of infre-
quent withdrawals are small. Even if the cost of capital is a
typical credit card interest rate of 15%, an employee with a
$50,000 annual salary will pay only $14 per quarter to bor-
row the funds necessary to ﬁnance a 6% increase in his
401(k) contribution rate.
19 If the cost of capital is the for-
gone after-tax earnings in a money market account (5%
interest), the cost is about $3 per quarter. Small carrying
costs also imply that the maximum withdrawal frequency
restrictions, minimum withdrawal amounts (which, if bind-
ing, can be dealt with by reducing the frequency of withdra-
wals), and check processing delays listed in the penultimate
row of table 2 do not substantially reduce arbitrage proﬁts.
17 If we person-weight instead of equal-weight each company, we ﬁnd
that at the average ﬁrm, 39% of match-eligible employees over 59½ forgo
arbitrage proﬁts averaging 1.24% of salary, or $353. Among those with
arbitrage losses, the average loss as a fraction of the maximum potential
loss is 86.5%.
18 We perform the sorts based on absolute dollar losses separately from
the sorts based on losses as a percentage of pay. Therefore, the employee
at a given percentile for one measure may not be the employee at that per-
centile for the other measure.
19 This amounts to (average debt of 6% of 1.5 months of salary)  
(monthly salary of $50,000/12)   (interest rate of 15%)   (1/4 of the
year) ¼ $14 per quarter.
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Table 5 displays calculations similar to those in table 3
(which does not account for time costs), but using a much
simpler loss deﬁnition. In table 5, we include the full amount
of any matching contribution forgone, without regard to the
employee’s age, vesting status, or after-tax account bal-
ances.
20 Note that the arbitrage losses in table 3 are a strict
subsetof thematches forgoneintable 5.
We present table 5 for two reasons. First, we want to
compare the behavior of employees older than 59½ to that
of employees younger than 59½. However, the contribute-
and-withdraw strategy is largely infeasible for employees
younger than 59½ because they must demonstrate ﬁnancial
hardship in order to withdraw money from their 401(k).
21
TABLE 5.—FORGONE EMPLOYER MATCHING CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1998
Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G
Match-eligible employees older than 59½
Number contributing less than match threshold 386 1,088 114 78 267 246 51
Fraction of sample 59½ and older contributing
less than match threshold
71.9% 52.2% 47.1% 20.4% 31.7% 30.1% 35.9%
Among those below the threshold:
Average fraction of maximum possible match forgone 96.5% 96.6% 33.9% 69.2% 80.6% 74.0% 20.2%
Fraction contributing nothing 93.5% 93.5% 21.1% 73.1% 68.5% 56.9% 7.8%
Among those contributing nothing, fraction who
have never enrolled in the 401(k)
40.7% 73.6% 25.1% 52.7% 71.1% 53.6% 50.0%
Average match forgone, percentage of annual pay 1.73% 0.72% 1.52% 2.07% 1.67% 2.38% 0.91%
Average match forgone, $ $221 $180 $638 $722 $693 $768 $313
Match-eligible employees younger than 59½
Fraction of sample younger than 59½ contributing
less than match threshold
70.6% 61.8% 66.2% 30.6% 37.1% 37.3% 46.9%
Among those below the threshold:
Average match forgone as percentage of maximum
available match
87.8% 93.8% 46.0% 67.9% 69.7% 69.6% 23.2%
Fraction contributing nothing 77.5% 86.4% 30.4% 60.2% 48.8% 50.7% 7.1%
Among those contributing nothing, fraction who
have never enrolled in the 401(k)
63.9% 78.8% 56.9% 39.0% 73.0% 72.0% 12.7%
Average match forgone, percentage of annual pay 1.44% 0.70% 2.06% 2.04% 1.40% 2.53% 1.04%
Average match forgone, $ $340 $194 $907 $726 $629 $840 $533
The sample is all employees eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution in 1998 and whose 1998 salary is more than that of a full-time minimum-wage worker. The ages used to sort employees into subsam-
ples are computed as of January 1, 1998. To maintain the conﬁdentiality of the companies analyzed, we do not report the number of employees under the age of 59½.
TABLE 4.—INCIDENCE OF ARBITRAGE LOSSES NET OF TIME COSTS IN 1998: EMPLOYEES OVER AGE 59½
Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G
Baseline (from table 3) 59.6%
($215)
46.7%
($162)
46.7%
($642)
20.4%
($722)
31.3%
($677)
24.0%
($782)
25.4%
($350)
Value of marginal hour ¼ ½ hourly wage
3 hours annually to execute arbitrage 59.6%
($205)
46.7%
($140)
46.7%
($606)
20.4%
($692)
31.3%
($642)
24.0%
($754)
25.4%
($313)
6 hours annually to execute arbitrage 58.8%
($196)
45.1%
($124)
36.8%
($723)
19.8%
($680)
31.0%
($611)
23.7%
($738)
12.7%
($554)
12 hours annually to execute arbitrage 57.5%
($179)
41.2%
($91)
25.6%
($955)
18.8%
($657)
29.3%
($573)
23.2%
($697)
12.0%
($513)
Value of marginal hour = hourly wage
3 hours annually to execute arbitrage 58.8%
($196)
45.1%
($124)
36.8%
($723)
19.8%
($680)
31.0%
($611)
23.7%
($738)
12.7%
($554)
6 hours annually to execute arbitrage 57.5%
($179)
41.2%
($91)
25.6%
($955)
18.8%
($657)
29.3%
($573)
23.2%
($697)
12.0%
($513)
12 hours annually to execute arbitrage 54.4%
($145)
36.1%
($15)
21.1%
($998)
15.9%
($644)
26.3%
($489)
22.2%
($613)
10.6%
($428)
This table shows the fraction of the sample that suffered arbitrage losses in 1998 exceeding the time costs of executing the contribute-and-withdraw strategy under various assumptions about the value of the mar-
ginal hour and the number of hours per year it takes to execute the strategy. In parentheses are the average dollar arbitrage losses net of time costs, conditional on having a positive net arbitrage loss. The sample is
employees who are age 59½ and older on January 1, 1998, eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution in 1998 and whose 1998 salary is more than that of a full-time minimum-wage worker. Arbitrage losses
arise from not contributing at least to the match threshold, being at least partially vested in the match, and not having after-tax balances that must be depleted before other balances can be withdrawn. Hourly wage is
computed by dividing annual salary by 1,750 hours.
20 To allow for rounding error, we continue not to classify those who
lost less than 0.1% of annual salary in matching contributions as having
forgone matching contributions.
21 Firms are not required to allow employees to make hardship withdra-
wals, although many do. Withdrawals are subject to a 10% tax penalty for
employees younger than 59½. There are some circumstances under which
younger employees can avoid the penalty. These include permanent dis-
ability, a court order pursuant to a divorce, medical expenditures in excess
of 7.5% of income, and some cases of early retirement or permanent lay-
off. Home purchases, educational expenses, or general ﬁnancial hardship
do not exempt employees from the tax penalty on early withdrawals.
756 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSThus, the arbitrage losses calculated in table 3 for employ-
ees older than 59½ do not extend in a straightforward way
to younger workers. We can, however, simply compare the
total matching contributions forgone by older and younger
employees. Second, other 401(k) data sets may not contain
all of the information needed to calculate arbitrage losses as
we have here. The simpler measure in table 5 allows for
easier comparison of this paper’s results with tabulations
from other data sources.
The top half of table 5 presents statistics on employees
older than 59½. At the average company, 41% of employ-
ees over 59½ contribute below the match threshold, for-
going an average of 1.6% of their salary, or $505. Matches
forgone are similar to arbitrage losses because most older
employees under the match threshold can unambiguously
proﬁt from the contribute-and-withdraw strategy; almost all
are fully vested in the employer match, and only a small
minority have after-tax balances that must be depleted
before before-tax withdrawals are allowed.
The bottom half of table 5 presents statistics on match-eli-
gible employees younger than 59½. Interestingly, the fraction
of employees contributing below the match threshold is gen-
erally similar among employees under age 59½ and employ-
ees over age 59½, differing by no more than 11 percentage
points, with the exception of Company C. There is, however,
one notable difference: employees younger than 59½ under
the match threshold are more likely to be contributing some-
thing to the 401(k), whereas older employees under the
match threshold are more prone to be contributing nothing at
all. There is no systematic tendency for younger employees
under the threshold to forgo more match dollars as a percen-
tage of their salary than older employees under the threshold.
However, the absolute dollar amounts forfeited by younger
employees under the threshold are usually higher.
In ﬁgure 1, we pool all of the match-eligible employees in
our seven companies and plot, by age, the fraction of
employees over the age of 59½ with arbitrage losses, as well
as the fraction of employees at all ages who contribute
below the match threshold. Consistent with the results in
tables 3 and 5, these two series are similar for employees
above age 59½. Over their entire working life, the likelihood
of contributing below the match threshold is U-shaped,
declining with age until the mid-50s and increasing after-
ward. Interestingly, this pattern mirrors the ﬁnding in Agar-
wal et al. (2009) that the quality of ﬁnancial decision making
peaks in the 50s in a variety of other domains, such as credit
card and mortgage choices. One might have expected a dis-
crete drop in the likelihood of contributing below the match
threshold at age 59½, when the 401(k) essentially becomes a
liquid asset. It is thus surprising that the failure to exploit
the match is increasing at an age when the economic reasons
for 401(k) participation become most compelling.
22 The
increase may arise from a selection effect generated by low
savers who are less able to afford to retire and thus remain
in the labor force longer. Alternatively, this phenomenon
may reﬂect consumption smoothing by older employees
whose wages are falling and who are unaware of the 401(k)
FIGURE 1.—FAILURE TO FULLY EXPLOIT THE 401(K)M ATCH IN 1998, BY AGE
This graph shows, by age, the fraction of match-eligible employees who either contributed below the match threshold or who had positive arbitrage losses in 1998. Employees in all seven sample ﬁrms are pooled
in this graph.
22 This upward turn at age 59 also appears if we instead calculate the
fraction under the match threshold separately by company, and then com-
pute an average that equally weights each company. The result is there-
fore not driven by certain companies having a disproportionate number of
employees at certain ages.
757 $100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALKwithdrawal privileges available only to older workers.
(Table 2 shows that the older employees at our ﬁrms usually
have a lower median wage than their younger counterparts.)
VI. Correlates of Arbitrage Losses and
Forgone Match Money
In this section, we explore the individual and plan char-
acteristics that are correlated with arbitrage losses (for
employees older than 59½) or forgone match money. We
consider four dependent variables: a dummy for having any
arbitrage loss, a dummy for contributing below the match
threshold, the size of an individual’s arbitrage loss as a per-
centage of pay, and the size of an individual’s forgone
matching contributions as a percentage of pay.
Table 6 shows regression results that control for gender,
marital status, log of tenure at the ﬁrm, log of salary, age
dummies, and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. We pool the match-eligible
employees in our seven ﬁrms and run separate regressions
for employees over 59½ and employees under 59½. The
regressions with binary dependent variables (having an
arbitrage loss or contributing below the match threshold)
are probits for which marginal effects at the sample means
are reported; the other regressions (arbitrage losses or for-
gone matching contributions as a percentage of salary) are
tobits where the dependent variable is censored below at
0% and above at the maximum possible value for each
employee.
23
We ﬁnd that among those over 59½ years old, men are
13 percentage points more likely to have an arbitrage loss,
those married are 7 percentage points less likely to have an
arbitrage loss, and a 1% increase in salary is associated with
a 0.35 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of having
an arbitrage loss. A 1% increase in tenure is associated with
a 0.04 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having
an arbitrage loss, since at six of our seven companies, hav-
ing very low tenure means one is completely unvested and
thus never classiﬁed as having an arbitrage loss. There is no
signiﬁcant age gradient in the probability of arbitrage losses
from age 59 to 63, but the incidence of arbitrage losses is
15 percentage points higher among 64 year olds than 59
year olds, and 21 percentage points higher among those at
least 65 years old than among 59 year olds. The results are
directionally similar when arbitrage loss as a percentage of
salary is the dependent variable. Males have a latent
TABLE 6—PREDICTORS OF ARBITRAGE LOSSES OR FORGONE EMPLOYER MATCHING CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1998, INCLUDING PLAN FIXED EFFECTS
Employees Older Than 59½ Employees Younger Than 59½
Has
Arbitrage
Losses
Contributes Less
Than Match
Threshold
Arbitrage
Losses
(% of salary)
Matching
Contributions
Forgone
(% of salary)
Contributes Less
Than Match
Threshold
Matching
Contributions
Forgone
(% of salary)
Male 0.129** 0.133** 0.723** 0.706** Male 0.063** 0.277**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.111) (0.106) (0.003) (0.015)
Married  0.066**  0.083**  0.401**  0.436** Married  0.047**  0.270**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.095) (0.092) (0.003) (0.014)
Log(Tenure) 0.041**  0.093** 0.147*  0.361** Log(Tenure)  0.091**  0.397**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.062) (0.052) (0.002) (0.008)
Log(Salary)  0.348**  0.373**  1.775**  1.838** Log(Salary)  0.354**  1.623**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.097) (0.093) (0.003) (0.016)
Age = 60 0.022 0.027 0.170 0.152 Age 20–29  0.143** 0.018
(0.025) (0.026) (0.146) (0.139) (0.036) (0.124)
Age = 61 0.028 0.036 0.308* 0.305* Age 30–39  0.160**  0.054
(0.027) (0.028) (0.155) (0.147) (0.037) (0.124)
Age = 62 0.025 0.049 0.361* 0.333* Age 40–49  0.152**  0.025
(0.030) (0.031) (0.172) (0.163) (0.037) (0.124)
Age = 63 0.015 0.011 0.109 0.042 Age 50–59½  0.216**  0.376**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.186) (0.178) (0.035) (0.125)
Age = 64 0.145** 0.088* 0.559** 0.487*
(0.038) (0.039) (0.207) (0.200)
Age   65 0.213** 0.123** 0.805** 0.670**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.156) (0.148)
Sample size 5,043 5,043 4,395 5,043 Sample size 158,894 158,894
This table presents the results of regressions with one of four dependent variables: (a) a binary indicator for whether an employee had arbitrage losses, (b) a binary indicator for whether an employee contributed
less than the match threshold, (c) arbitrage losses as a percentage of salary, and (d) matching contributions forgone as a percentage of salary. Regressions with binary dependent variables are probits, and regressions
with continuous dependent variables are tobits censored below at 0% and above at the maximum possible value for each individual. The sample is restricted to employees eligible for their 401(k) match and whose
1998 salary is more than that of a full-time minimum-wage worker. The sample for the arbitrage loss as a percentage of pay regression is further restricted to exclude participants who contribute below the match
threshold but whom we do not categorize as having arbitrage losses due to their after-tax balances or vesting status. The ages used to sort employees into subsamples are computed as of January 1, 1998. The explana-
tory variables are a male dummy, a married dummy, the participant’s age on January 1, 1998, the log of the number of years since the participant’s original hire date as of December 31, 1998, and the log of the parti-
cipant’s salary in 1998. Firm ﬁxed effects are included, although their coefﬁcients are not reported. For the probit regressions, the point estimates are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the explanatory vari-
ables; the marginal effect reported for dummy variables is the effect of changing the variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. **Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
23 The sample is smaller for the arbitrage loss as a percentage of salary
regression than for the other regressions because we exclude individuals
contributing below the match threshold who are classiﬁed as not having
an arbitrage loss because of their after-tax balances or because they are
completely unvested. We drop these individuals because their arbitrage
loss is computed to be zero regardless of their contribution rate, so in
some sense, their loss is both left- and right-censored.
758 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS(uncensored) loss as a percentage of salary that is larger by
0.7 percentage points, the married have a loss that is smaller
by 0.4 percentage points, a 1% increase in tenure is asso-
ciated with a loss that is larger by 0.001 percentage points,
a 1% increase in salary is associated with a loss that is smal-
ler by 0.02 percentage points, and losses are generally
increasing in age.
When the dependent variable is an indicator for simply
contributing less than the match threshold, the coefﬁcients
on the explanatory variables are mostly similar to those
when the dependent variable is an indicator for having
arbitrage losses. The one exception is log tenure, which
positively predicts the probability of having an arbitrage
loss but negatively predicts the likelihood of contributing
less than the threshold. This difference is driven by the
tenure-based vesting rules, which affect the arbitrage loss
calculations but not the classiﬁcation of whether an
employee is contributing less than the match threshold. The
regression of matching contributions forgone as a percen-
tage of salary exhibits similar patterns with respect to the
regression of arbitrage losses as a percentage of salary.
Turning to the sample of those under 59½ years old, we
ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of most variables are qualitatively
similar for employees above and below 59½ years of age.
Among younger employees, being male, unmarried, re-
cently hired, and low-salaried increases the likelihood of
contributing less than the match threshold. The variable
with qualitatively different results is age. Among employ-
ees younger than 59½, age is negatively related to leaving
match money on the table, while the reverse is true
for employees older than 59½—a pattern consistent with
ﬁgure 1.
In table 7, we replace the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects with three
variables associated with the 401(k) plan rules: the rate at
which the ﬁrst dollar of employee contributions to the plan
is matched, the maximum possible match the employee can
receive as a percentage of salary, and the employee’s vest-
ing percentage as of January 1, 1999. As expected, once
vesting percentage is controlled for, the probability of hav-
ing an arbitrage loss and the size of arbitrage losses are de-
creasing in tenure. The coefﬁcients on the other employee
characteristics remain qualitatively similar to those in the
TABLE 7—PREDICTORS OF ARBITRAGE LOSSES OR FORGONE EMPLOYER MATCHING CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1998, INCLUDING 401(K)P LAN RULE CONTROLS
Employees Older Than 59½ Employees Younger Than 59½
Has
Arbitrage
Losses
Contributes Less
Than Match
Threshold
Arbitrage
Losses
(% of salary)
Matching
Contributions
Forgone
(% of salary)
Contributes Less
Than Match
Threshold
Matching
Contributions
Forgone
(% of salary)
Male 0.064** 0.058** 0.582** 0.519** Male 0.027** 0.180**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.096) (0.093) (0.003) (0.015)
Married  0.029  0.044**  0.320**  0.309** Married  0.054**  0.309**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.090) (0.087) (0.003) (0.014)
Log(Tenure)  0.067**  0.063**  0.198**  0.233** Log(Tenure)  0.046**  0.105**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.067) (0.065) (0.003) (0.014)
Log(Salary)  0.272**  0.298**  1.584**  1.616** Log(Salary)  0.290**  1.507**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.088) (0.084) (0.003) (0.015)
Age = 60 0.025 0.025 0.174 0.143 Age 20–29  0.164**  0.058
(0.025) (0.026) (0.146) (0.139) (0.035) (0.124)
Age = 61 0.039 0.037 0.321* 0.302* Age 30–39  0.177**  0.072
(0.027) (0.028) (0.155) (0.148) (0.036) (0.124)
Age = 62 0.042 0.054 0.398* 0.344* Age 40–49  0.177**  0.087
(0.030) (0.031) (0.172) (0.164) (0.037) (0.124)
Age = 63 0.020 0.015 0.146 0.049 Age 50–59½  0.251**  0.477**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.186) (0.178) (0.033) (0.125)
Age = 64 0.122** 0.094* 0.561** 0.517**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.208) (0.201)
Age   65 0.110** 0.128** 0.752** 0.726**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.157) (0.152)
First-dollar match rate 0.127 0.143  1.011* 0.021 First-dollar 0.533** 1.896**
(0.090) (0.092) (0.516) (0.493) match rate (0.013) (0.065)
Maximum match %  6.685**  4.948** 16.082  6.530 Maximum  9.741**  19.483**
(1.666) (1.678) (9.774) (9.024) match % (0.254) (1.250)
% vested 0.544**  0.112** 0.292  0.547** % vested  0.132**  0.923**
(0.041) (0.039) (0.306) (0.195) (0.007) (0.031)
Sample size 5,043 5,043 4,395 5,043 Sample size 158,894 158,894
This table presents the results of regressions with one of four dependent variables: (a) a binary indicator for whether an employee had arbitrage losses, (b) a binary indicator for whether an employee contributed
less than the match threshold, (c) arbitrage losses as a percentage of salary, and (d) matching contributions forgone as a percentage of salary. Regressions with binary dependent variables are probits, and regressions
with continuous dependent variables are tobits censored below at 0% and above at the maximum possible value for each individual. The sample is restricted to employees eligible for their 401(k) match and whose
1998 salary is more than that of a full-time minimum-wage worker. The sample for the arbitrage loss as a percentage of pay regression is further restricted to exclude participants who contribute below the match
threshold but whom we do not categorize as having arbitrage losses due to their after-tax balances or vesting status. The ages used to sort employees into subsamples are computed as of January 1, 1998. The explana-
tory variables are a male dummy, a married dummy, the participant’s age on January 1, 1998, the log of the number of years since the participant’s original hire date as of December 31, 1998, the log of the partici-
pant’s salary in 1998, the rate at which the ﬁrst dollar contributed is matched, the maximum possible match the employee can receive as a percentage of salary, and the employee’s vesting percentage as of January 1,
1999. For the last three variables, 1% is coded as 0.01. For the probit regressions, the point estimates are marginal effects evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables; the marginal effect reported for dummy
variables is the effect of changing the variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. **Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
759 $100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALKﬁrm ﬁxed-effects regressions, except that marital status
loses signiﬁcance in predicting the presence of an arbitrage
loss.
The coefﬁcients on the plan rule variables themselves
indicate that among those over 59½ years old, a higher ﬁrst-
dollar match rate is associated with lower arbitrage loss
magnitudes, and a higher maximum possible match is asso-
ciated with a lower probability of having an arbitrage loss
or contributing less than the match threshold. Vesting per-
centages are positively correlated with the probability of
having an arbitrage loss, but negatively correlated with the
probability of contributing less than the match threshold
and the amount of matching contributions forgone. Among
younger employees, a higher ﬁrst-dollar match rate is asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood of contributing less than the
match threshold and a higher amount of matching contribu-
tions forgone. But a higher maximum possible match is
negatively associated with these two outcomes. The plan
rule coefﬁcients must be interpreted with caution. The cor-
relations may not be causal, because the ﬁrms could be
adjusting their plan rules in response to their employees’
savings propensities, and employees could be self-sorting
into ﬁrms based on the ﬁt between their savings propensi-
ties and the ﬁrm’s 401(k) plan rules.
VII. Field Experiment
To gain further insight into why employees are contribut-
ing suboptimally to their 401(k) and to see if providing
information about the employer match and withdrawal rules
would increase 401(k) contributions, we conducted a ﬁeld
experiment at Company F in partnership with Hewitt
Associates. On August 3 and 4, 2004, we mailed treatment
and control surveys to 889 Company F employees over the
age of 59½. The survey sample included all 689 employees
at Company F who were contributing less than the match
threshold as of May 2004, as well as 200 randomly selected
employees contributing at or above the match threshold.
We randomly divided our sample of 689 employees con-
tributing below the match threshold into two equal-sized
subgroups: a control group and a treatment group. The con-
trol group survey included questions about the employee’s
satisfaction with and knowledge about the 401(k) plan, gen-
eral ﬁnancial literacy, and savings preferences.
24 The con-
trol survey was also sent to all of the 200 employees contri-
buting at or above the match threshold. The treatment
group survey was identical to the control survey, except that
it included ﬁve additional questions designed to educate the
respondent, which we describe later. We estimate that it
would take employees about ﬁfteen minutes to complete
the control survey and twenty minutes to complete the treat-
ment survey.
To 200 employees in each of the three groups (below the
match-threshold control group, above the match-threshold
control group, and below the match-threshold treatment
group), we promised a $50 American Express Gift Cheque
if they responded no later than August 27, 2004. Even in
non-401(k) domains, employees below the match threshold
appeared less willing or able to collect cheap money than
employees at or above the match threshold. The survey
response rate among employees at or above the match
threshold was much higher (52%) than among employees
below the threshold who were offered $50 (24%), even
though the former group’s median income is higher than
the latter’s.
25 The average respondent contributing at least
up to the match threshold took 15.1 days to mail the survey
back to us, while the average respondent below the thresh-
old who received $50 took 17.6 days, suggesting that
employees below the threshold are more prone to procrasti-
nate.
Due to the low overall response rate, we only brieﬂy
summarize the key ﬁndings from the survey. A more
detailed discussion is in Choi, Laibson, and Madrian
(2005).
Consistent with the difference in response delays, fewer
respondents at or above the match threshold (11%) than
respondents under the threshold (16%) reported themselves
to often or almost always leave things to the last minute.
We ﬁnd little evidence that direct transactions costs are pro-
hibitive. The average respondent who was not participating
in the 401(k) plan believed that it would take 1.7 hours
to join the plan, 1.3 hours to change his plan contribution
rate for the ﬁrst time, and 1.5 hours to change his plan
asset allocation for the ﬁrst time. The average respondent
who had actually engaged in these transactions reported
even lower averages of 1.4, 0.6, and 0.6 hours, respectively.
Among employees who claimed that they did not ever plan
on enrolling in the 401(k), none cited the time it would take
to enroll as a reason for nonparticipation. There was a strik-
ing lack of ﬁnancial literacy among those below the match
threshold. Fifty-three percent incorrectly believed their own
employer’s stock to be less risky than a large U.S. stock
mutual fund, a belief shared by only 26% of employees
contributing at or above the match threshold.
26 Employees
saving below the match threshold were also not particularly
knowledgeable about their 401(k) plan features: only 21%
were able to correctly state their employer match rate, and
only 27% were able to correctly state the match threshold.
In contrast, employees at or above the threshold were able
to correctly state these ﬁgures 41% and 59% of the time,
respectively.
The main purpose of the survey was to see whether
employees under the match threshold would increase their
401(k) contributions if the beneﬁts of the employer match
and the penalty-free withdrawal rules were explained to
24 See Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005) for a copy of the survey.
25 The 289 employees contributing below the match threshold who were
not offered the $50 Gift Cheque were instead entered into a rafﬂe if they
responded. The response rate was 11% among this population.
26 See John Hancock Financial Services (2002) and Benartzi et al.
(2007) for the results from other surveys asking similar questions.
760 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSthem. To accomplish this, the survey sent to the treatment
group included an additional ﬁve questions at the end. The
ﬁrst three asked when the respondent became aware of the
following facts: (a) the company matches the ﬁrst 6% of
salary contributed to the 401(k), (b) transactions in the
401(k) could be made over the Internet, by a touch-tone
phone system, or by speaking to a beneﬁts center represen-
tative on the phone, and (c) penalty-free withdrawals from
the 401(k) were available for any reason for participants
over age 59½. The fourth question asked respondents to cal-
culate the amount of employer match money they would
lose each year if they did not contribute at all to the 401(k).
Respondents received a matrix of match amounts corre-
sponding to various match rates and salaries to aid this cal-
culation. The median respondent calculated that he would
lose $1,200 each year if he contributed nothing. The ﬁnal
question asked if the employee was interested in raising his
contribution rate to 6% in light of the losses just calculated.
Table 8 presents the average 401(k) contribution rates,
adding together the before-tax and after-tax rates, on August
1, 2004 (immediately prior to the survey mailing) and
November 1, 2004 (approximately two months after the sur-
vey response deadline), for employees who were under the
match threshold in May 2004 (when the survey mailing list
was ﬁnalized) and still with the company on November 1,
2004. The average contribution rates of the control and treat-
ment groups increased over this period, but by a very small
amount: 0.07% and 0.17% of pay for the control and treat-
ment groups, respectively. The intent-to-treat effect, which
is the difference in the average contribution rate change
between the two groups, was only an increase of 0.10% of
pay, which is statistically insigniﬁcant.
27 Using receipt of
the treatment survey as an instrument for reading and return-
ing the treatment survey, we estimated a larger treatment
effect—a 0.67 percentage point increase in the contribution
rate—but this effect remains statistically insigniﬁcant, mak-
ing it difﬁcult to draw strong conclusions about the interven-
tion’s efﬁcacyamongthose itsuccessfully reached.
VIII. Conclusion
Despite the presence of employer matching contributions
in 401(k) plans, a substantial fraction of employees fail to
contribute up to their employer’s match threshold. For some
employees, it is possible to rationalize their willingness to
leave employer 401(k) matching contributions on the table
by appealing to factors such as liquidity constraints, early
withdrawal penalties, and lack of vesting of the match. In
this paper, we examine the 401(k) contribution choices of a
group of employees for whom these explanations do not
apply. These employees are older than 59½, receive
employer matching contributions, are vested, and can with-
draw from their 401(k) for any reason without penalty. For
these employees, contributing below the match threshold
violates the no-arbitrage condition for their portfolio.
Nevertheless, in the average ﬁrm in our sample, 36% of
match-eligible employees over 59½ forgo free lunches by
contributing under the threshold, losing arbitrage proﬁts
that are on average 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. The
dollar amount of the arbitrage losses over a longer time hor-
izon is likely much larger. The widespread failure of the
no-arbitrage condition in this context suggests that these
employees suffer additional utility losses from imperfect
optimization in other areas of their investing and saving.
Based on survey evidence coupled with cost-beneﬁt ana-
lysis, we rule out direct transactions costs as the primary
reason for the failure to fully exploit the employer match.
Instead, we ﬁnd evidence that employees contributing below
the match threshold are more prone to procrastinate and are
less ﬁnancially literate than those at or above the match
threshold. Providing information on the size and liquidity of
the employer match raises 401(k) contribution rates, but the
effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Our results are cause for pessimism about the ability of
monetary incentives alone to increase savings in the left tail
of the savings distribution. Despite offering costly matching
programs with strong marginal ﬁnancial incentives, the
ﬁrms studied here were unable to induce many of their
older employees to contribute up to the match threshold.
Although matching alone does not appear sufﬁcient to sig-
niﬁcantly increase savings in the left tail, it may be more
effective when combined with other interventions that
account for employee passivity (Madrian & Shea, 2001;
Benartzi & Thaler, 2004; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, &
Metrick, 2002, 2004; Carroll et al., 2009; Beshears et al.,
2010b) or sharply reduce the complexity of the savings and
investment decision (Beshears et al., 2010a; Duﬂo, et al.,
2006; Mitchell, Utkus, & Yang, 2006; Choi, Laibson, &
Madrian, 2009).
TABLE 8.—FIELD EXPERIMENT RESULTS,C OMPANY F
Pre-Survey
(8/1/2004)
Post-Survey
(11/1/2004)
Change
(Post – Pre)
Treatment group 1.74% 1.91% 0.17%
(N = 315) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08)
Control group 2.09% 2.17% 0.07%
(N = 320) (0.16) (0.16) (0.05)
Difference  0.35%  0.26% 0.10%
(Treatment – Control) (0.22) (0.23) (0.09)
Instrumental variable estimate
of treatment effect
0.67%
(0.63)
This table shows the average 401(k) contribution rates as a percentage of pay on August 1, 2004 (pre-
survey) and November 1, 2004 (post-survey), for the treatment and control groups, as well as differences
across groups and across time. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is Company F employees
contributing below the match threshold in May 2004. The control group received a mailed survey about
their 401(k) plan. The treatment group received the control survey plus additional questions that high-
lighted the losses from not contributing up to the match threshold. The last row gives the instrumental
variable estimate of the treatment effect, where assignment to the treatment group is an instrument for
completing the survey.
27 It is not the case that any marginal mailing regarding the 401(k) is
doomed to have a negligible intent-to-treat effect. See Beshears et al.
(2010a) and Choi et al. (2009) for examples of mailings that have large
intent-to-treat effects on 401(k) contribution rates.
761 $100 BILLS ON THE SIDEWALKFinally, the results in this paper speak more generally to
the role of the no-arbitrage condition in economic equilibria.
Among the population studied in this paper, unexploited
arbitrage opportunities are commonly observed, despite the
fact that the potential gains are large and the necessary strat-
egy to capitalize on these gains is simple. Our evidence sug-
gests that in noncompetitive domains like retirement saving,
where the failure to maximize cannot be exploited by others,
arbitrageopportunitiesmay persist inequilibrium.
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